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I. INTRODUCTION
With increasingly larger television contracts, rising ticket prices, and rapid
expansion of university athletic budgets, intercollegiate athletics has become
"big business."' As this "business" has boomed, the relationship between the
student-athlete2 and the university has changed. Athletic scholarship awards
require student-athletes to perform services for the university,3 a requirement
that distinguishes them from other students and places them in a unique and
increasingly significant relationship with the university. Today's student-
athletes generate interest in their universities, media attention, and revenue,
while as standard bearers, they are expected to uphold the integrity of their
sponsoring institutions in competition. 4 Yet, despite the obligations and
responsibilities imposed on student-athletes by their respective universities and
I See Steve Turcotte, Washington Profits Due to Football, USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 1991,
at 10C (University of Washington Athletic Department official stating that "College sports
have become big business .... In this day, you have to treat it like a business, because
that's almost what it is."); Steve Wieberg & Tom Witosky, Michigan and UCLA Struggle,
USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 1991, at 10C (University of Michigan Athletic Department's total
operational expenditures have risen from $12.06 million in 1985 to nearly $22 million in
1991); James V. Koch, 77w Economic Realities of Amateur Sports Organization, 61 kqD.
L.J. 9, 14 (1985) (In 1984, the last year the NCAA controlled the television rights to its
own championship tournaments, the NCAA earned over $31 million from selling the rights
to televise the NCAA men's Division I basketball championship. Prior to 1984, the NCAA
and its member institutions shared over $65 million per year from television contracts for
college football.).
2 The term "student-athlete" will be used throughout this Note to refer to college
students whose tuition and required institutional expenses are funded by a full grant-in-aid
(athletic scholarship). This Note will examine the legal implications of athletic scholarship
agreements for student-athletes, especially those participating in the two major revenue-
producing sports of football and basketball.
3 Current NCAA rules permit educational institutions to terminate scholarship benefits
during the term of the award should student-athletes cease to participate in their sports for
reasons other than serious injury. See NCAA BYLAWS §§ 15.3.3, 15.3.4 (1991-92); see
also Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 192
S.E.2d 197 (1972); Begley v. Corporation of Mercer Univ., 367 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Tenn.
1973).
4 Derek Q. Johnson, Educating Misguided Student Athletes: An Application of Contract
Theory, 85 CoLum. L. REv. 96, 105 (1985).
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the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA),5 courts have been
reluctant to grant student-athletes significant legal remedies and protections to
equalize the bargaining power of the parties in athletic scholarship agreements.
In the 1983 case of Rensing v. Indiana State Board of Trustees,6 the
Supreme Court of Indiana addressed the issue of whether a student-athlete who
sustained permanent injury in a football practice qualified as a university
employee entitled to benefits under the state Worker's Compensation Act. 7 It
vacated the decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals s and denied the student-
athlete benefits, citing the absence of an employee-employer relationship
between the student-athlete and the university.9 The Rensing court based its
decision in part on the belief that athletic scholarships are educational grants
that primarily benefit students by allowing them to pursue advanced educational
opportunities. 10 Though the Rensing decision is now a decade old, it illustrates
well the broad range of legal issues currently associated with athletic
scholarships. It discloses both the inconsistencies and the imbalance of
bargaining power characterizing today's scholarship agreements, and it reveals
the need for reform to avoid future litigation.
This Note examines the reasoning in Rensing and expands upon the issues
raised in that case in an effort to reveal the complicated legal obligations in
athletic scholarship agreements. In addition, this Note discusses several issues
which, though not specifically addressed in Rensing, deserve attention in light
of contemporary practices in intercollegiate athletics. Part II discusses the
contractual nature of athletic scholarships and differs with the Rensing court's
determination that there was no employment contract between Rensing, the
student-athlete, and Indiana State University. Part III explores the Indiana
Supreme Court's failure to discuss the issues of implied contracts and the
potential liability of universities that actively recruit athletes to participate in
their athletic programs. Part IV examines the Rensing court's analysis and its
application of section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code. This Note
demonstrates how the NCAA bylaws governing athletic scholarship agreements
and the present "big business" environment of intercollegiate athletics satisfy
the two judicial tests most frequently used to determine whether scholarship
benefits should be included in gross income. In doing so, this Note examines
5 The NCAA is the primary governing body of intercollegiate athletics. The
Association includes approximately 175 organizations and conferences and some 800
member universities. See Koch, supra note 1, at 11-12.
6 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983).
7 See IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-1-1 (Burns 1991).
8 Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 437 N.E.2d 78 (Ind. Ct. App.
1982).




of section 117. Part V argues that due process protection should be extended to
student-athletes whose scholarships are not renewed by their universities.
Finally, while discussing the difficulties of establishing an employee-employer
relationship between the student-athlete and the university, Part VI concludes
this Note by proposing amendments to the NCAA bylaws governing athletic
scholarships.
II. ATHLETIC SCHOLARSHIPS As EXPREss CONTRACTS
A. Overview
While the Rensing court found no employment contract between the
student-athlete and the university," courts have recognized that an athletic
scholarship agreement imposes contractual obligations on both parties. Taylor
v. Wake Forest University12 was the first major court decision to hold that a
contract right exists between the student-athlete and the university. In Taylor, a
football player at Wake Forest University sought to recover the cost of funding
his education when his athletic scholarship was terminated for refusal to
participate in team practices. The player, Taylor, had suffered poor grades in
his first semester and despite significant grade improvement exceeding the
minimum University participation requirements, had refused to participate in
daily football practices. The University terminated Taylor's scholarship, citing
the player's failure to comply with his contractual obligations under the
scholarship agreement. 13 The court ruled in favor of the University, finding
that the scholarship agreement created contractual obligations requiring Taylor
to maintain academic as well as athletic eligibility. 14 These requirements
included participation in practice sessions. Taylor's failure to meet this
obligation, held the court, justified the University's termination of scholarship
benefits.
Shortly after Taylor was decided, a federal court reaffirmed the belief that
an athletic scholarship created a contractual relationship between the student-
athlete and the university. In Begley v. Corporation of Mercer University,15
Begley, a student-athlete, brought a breach of contract claim against Mercer
University for revoking his scholarship when it discovered that his high school
grades did not satisfy the NCAA minimum requirements. The court granted the
University summary judgment, stating that Begley's grades violated a provision
I1 Id. at 1175.
12 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
13 Id. at 381.
14 Id. at 382.
15 367 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
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in the scholarship agreement requiring him to meet and abide by all NCAA
rules and regulations. More importantly, the court placed particular
significance on the intentions of the two parties, concluding that under an
athletic scholarship agreement the university provides the student-athlete with
monetary aid for the completion of an undergraduate degree in exchange for
participation in the university's athletic program. 16
The Taylor and Begley decisions lend support for the proposition that an
athletic scholarship creates an employee-employer relationship between the
student-athlete and the university. Yet prior to Taylor and Begley, courts
limited the finding of employer-employee relationships to cases in which
student-athletes were provided campus jobs contingent on their continued
participation in the school's athletic program. 17 The Rensing case marked one
of the first times in which a court considered whether an athletic scholarship
agreement alone was sufficient to create an employment contract. 18
B. NCAA Constitution and Bylaws: Form over Substance
The Rensing court focused on those provisions of the NCAA Constitution
and bylaws incorporated into Rensing's scholarship agreement. 19 These
provisions played a significant role in helping the court reach its decision that
there was no employment contract between Rensing and Indiana State
University. The court acknowledged that one of the basic principles governing
intercollegiate athletics is the concept of "amateurism," which holds that
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation and that there is a clear
16 The Begley court stated: "It was the obvious intention of Mercer to extend monetary
aid in the stipulated amount to Mr. Begley for his use in working toward the completion of
an undergraduate degree in exchange for his participation in its basketball program...."
Id. at 909-10.
17 See Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Dist. Ct. App.
1963); University of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953).
NCAA rules usually prohibit a student-athlete on full scholarship to be employed
during the term or semester because the university must include the student-athlete's
employment earnings towards the full grant-in-aid limit set by the NCAA. NCAA BYLAWS
§§ 15.1, 15.2.6 (1991-92).
18 Athletic scholarships at Division I schools require the athlete to sign a National
Letter of Intent which contractually restricts the athlete from attending another university.
The educational grant received by the athlete is limited to a one-year term with no
guarantee of annual renewal. In addition, the university may cancel the award during the
period if a student voluntarily withdraws from the team. See Adam Hoeflich, The Taxation
of Athletic Scholarships: A Problem of Consistency, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 581, 594-95.




demarcation between college and professional sports.20 The court further
asserted that it is a fundamental tenet of NCAA policies that intercollegiate
sports are only to be maintained as a portion of the educational program and
that student-athletes are an integral part of the student body.21 The court
concluded by stating that an athlete receiving financial aid is not compensated
to participate in a sport, but rather is to be "first and foremost a student."22
Although the court's analysis conforms to an idealized conception of
intercollegiate athletics held by the NCAA and its members, its reasoning
appears inappropriate in light of contemporary practices in intercollegiate
athletics. The principles behind NCAA policies are reflected in form, not
substance, when juxtaposed against the demands placed on student-athletes
competing in the "big business" environment of intercollegiate athletics. 23
The Rensing court also based its decision on the NCAA's strict rules
against student-athletes receiving pay.24 The court argued that, because the
NCAA rules against receiving pay were incorporated into the financial
agreement, the claim that the agreement established an employee-employer
relationship had no basis.25 One commentator, however, has criticized the
2 0 1d. See also NCAA CONST. § 2.6 (1991-92). "The Principle of Amateurism" states:
"Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport.... Student participation in
intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises." Id.
21 Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1173. It is difficult to accept this line of reasoning when
today's student-athletes receive much different treatment from the university than the rest of
the general student body. See Edward G. Lawry, Conflicting Interests Make Refonn of
College Sports Impossible, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 1, 1991, at A44. Lawry claims
that student-athletes are not representative of the student body. He argues that student-
athletes have special tutors; they frequently live in separate dorms, eat different food, and
follow enrollment procedures not provided to other students. Id.
22 Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1173.
23 A federal district court in Minnesota appeared to discredit the lofty ideals and
principles governing college athletics when it examined the student-athlete's position within
the current environment of intercollegiate sports:
This court is not saying that athletes are incapable of scholarship; however they
are given little incentive to be scholars and few persons care how the student
athlete performs academically .... It well may be true that a good academic
program for the athlete is made virtually impossible by the demands of their [sic]
sport at the college level. If this situation causes harm to the University, it is
because they [sic] have fostered it and the institution rather than the individual
should suffer the consequence.
Hall v. University of Minn., 530 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D. Minn. 1982).
24 Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1173. If student-athletes receive pay they may lose their
amateur status and the opportunity to compete in intercollegiate athletics.
5 Id.
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court for emphasizing select portions of the NCAA Constitution and bylaws to
support its conclusion. 26 A close examination of the 1982-83 NCAA
Constitution reveals that while educational grants received by athletes in
exchange for their athletic participation were acknowledged to be a form of
"pay," they were considered an exception to the rule against compensation. 27
The NCAA has since amended the language of this provision to exclude
mention of the receipt of scholarship funds in its discussion of compensation. 28
Perhaps the strongest argument against the position that athletic
scholarships are not to be considered "pay" comes from the recent Knight
Commission report.29 In rejecting the idea of paying college athletes to
participate in intercollegiate athletics, the Knight Commission stated that
"[s]cholarship athletes are already paid in the most meaningful way possible:
with a free education." 30 While the Knight Commission report does not view
students participating in college sports as professional athletes, it does seem to
concede, though perhaps not intentionally, that athletic scholarships are a form
of compensation. This recognition undermines the Rensing court's argument.
In rejecting the claim that an employment contract existed between Rensing
and the University, the court argued that NCAA regulations conflict with the
proposition that a student-athlete receives a scholarship in return for the
services provided the university by participating in a varsity sport.31 The court
argued that pursuant to the NCAA Constitution, "the institution cannot, in any
26 Robert C. Rafferty, Note, Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of Trustees:
The Status of College Scholarship Athlete-Employee or Student?, 13 CAP. U.L. REV. 87, 98
(1985).
2 7 Id. The 1982-83 NCAA Constitution stated:
(a) An individual shall not be eligible for participation in an intercollegiate sport if
the individual:
(3) Has directly or indirectly used athletic skill for pay in any form in
that sport; however, a student athlete may accept or have accepted
scholarships or educational grants-in-aid administered by an educational
institution which do not conflict with the governing legislation of this
Association.
Id. at 98-99 (quoting NCAA CONST. § 3-1(a)-(3) (1982-83)) (emphasis added).
28 See NCAA BYLAWS § 12.1.2 (1991-92).
29 Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete: A New Model For Intercollegiate Athletics,
KNIGHT FOUNDATION COMMiSSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 11 (1991). The Knight
Commission is a private foundation formed for the purpose of studying intercollegiate
athletics and offering proposals for reform.30 ld. at 11.
31 See Rafferty, supra note 26, at 99.
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way, condition financial aid on a student's ability as an athlete." 32 However,
the court referred only to a small section of the appropriate NCAA regulation.
The court failed to address the language of the provision that reads:
"[i]nstitutional aid may not be gradated or canceled during the period of its
award (i) on the basis of a student-athlete's ability or his contribution to a
team's success." 33 As one commentator has argued, "during the period" only
prohibits the educational institution from terminating the scholarship based on
athletic ability during the term of the award. 34 After the one-year term has
expired, the NCAA does not explicitly prevent the institution from using
athletic ability as a factor in its decision to renew or deny scholarship
benefits. 35
C. Problems with a One-Year Scholarship Tenn
In considering the Rensing court's position that college athletes are "first
and foremost students," it is particularly troubling that athletic scholarships are
limited to one year. 36 The one-year athletic scholarships currently offered by
Division I schools seem to contradict the Rensing court's assertion. A one-year
term potentially allows more pressure, both subtle and overt, to be exerted on
student-athletes to improve athletic, rather than academic, performance to
ensure renewal of scholarship benefits.
A comparison of the flexibility enjoyed by the university and the student-
athlete reveals a significant imbalance. Under the current system, the university
enjoys full protection because its contractual obligation to educate its student-
athletes is not permitted to exceed one academic year.37 Conversely, student-
athletes have little flexibility under the agreement because harsh penalties are
enforced if they decide to transfer to another university.3 8 Upon signing a
National Letter of Intent while in high school, student-athletes are required to
attend the named institution for the upcoming academic year or forego
participation in athletics at another university until two full academic years have
been completed in residence at the latter institution. 39 If, after completing their
first year, student-athletes decide to transfer to another university, they are
32 Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind.
1983).
33 Rafferty, supra note 26, at 99 (quoting NCAA CONST. § 3-4(c)-(1) (1982-83)).
34 Id.35 Id.
36 See NCAA BYLAWs § 15.3.3.1 (1991-92).
37 Id.
38 See NCAA BYLAWS 14.6.1 (1991-92).
39 COLLEGIATE CoMMIoSIONERs ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL LETTER oF INTENr, § 2
(1990-91).
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generally not permitted to participate in intercollegiate athletics for one full
year.40
The one-year scholarship agreement is also subject to abuse by coaches,
who might threaten nonrenewal of scholarship benefits if a student-athlete's
athletic performance does not improve. While some universities have rules that
prohibit scholarship renewal determinations based on athletic performance,
these rules may rely on vague language that does not entirely eliminate the
possibility that scholarship renewals will be denied, in part or in whole, on the
basis of athletic ability.41
Finally, NCAA bylaws do not even ensure automatic renewal of a student-
athlete's scholarship benefits in the event that "the recipient sustains an injury
that prevents him or her from competing in intercollegiate athletics ... "42
The tenuousness caused by the one-year term limitation on athletic scholarships
supports the assertion that such agreements are quidpro quo arrangements and
not simply educational grants-in-aid.
III. UNiVERSITY LIABILITY UNDER IMPLID CONTRACT THEORY
In reaching its decision, the Rensing court purported to consider the
existence of a contract of employment, either expressed or implied.43 The
existence of an implied contract may not only prove significant in determining
whether an employee-employer relationship exists between the student-athlete
and the university, but it also may expose the university to other legal
obligations.
In Rensing, the court rejected the existence of an express employment
contract but failed to analyze the potential existence of an implied contract. 44
40 See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 38.
41 See, e.g., O-o STATE UNIvERsrrY DEPARTMENT oF INrERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS,
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE OSU STUDENT-ATHLETE 16 (1991-92). The Ohio State
University establishes scholarship renewal policies pursuant to the provisions of the Big Ten
Conference's Tender of Financial Aid. The Ohio State University renewal policy states: "(3)
Relative lack of the [sic] athletic ability... will not result in denied renewal of grant-in-
aid." Id. It is unclear why the University chose to use the words "relative lack" of athletic
ability instead of incorporating explicit language that would prohibit nonrenewal based on
any assessment of athletic ability or performance.
42 NCAA BYLAWS § 15.3.3.1.2 (1991-92). It is important to note that research for this
Note failed to discover any claims by injured student-athletes whose scholarships had been
denied renewal on the basis of an inability to physically participate in the school's athletic
program.
43 Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind.
1983).
44 Implied contracts are of two kinds. An "implied-in-fact" contract is one in which the
existence of an agreement is inferred from conduct evidencing contractual intent. See
1408 [V/ol. 53:1401
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While courts have held that student residence hall and cafeteria assistants are
not university employees, 45 the Rensing case can be distinguished given the
promises made during recruiting, the control exercised by the university and its
coaches over the student-athlete's daily activities, the extent of participation
required, and the profit gained by the university from intercollegiate athletics. 46
In light of these facts, a strong argument can be made that, despite the absence
of a formal employment contract, there exists an implied contract between the
student-athlete and the university.
Beyond the employment contract itself, both the awarding of athletic
scholarships and the active recruitment of student-athletes 47 can expose the
university to other suits based on an implied contract theory. Although outside
the setting of university athletics, Lowenthal v. Vanderbilt University8
provides precedent to be applied to cases involving intercollegiate athletic
programs. In Lowenthal, a Tennessee court found that a contractual relationship
existed between students and their university which imposed liability on the
university for failure to provide a group of graduate students with a quality
management program as had been promised. 49 The decision in Lowenthal
emphasizes at least one court's belief that a university is legally responsible for
providing its students with the programs that induced their attendance.
At present, an implied contract theory is being used by members of the
Yale University wrestling team. The wrestlers filed suit against the university
claiming that it breached an implied contract when it canceled funding for their
sport in the spring of 1990.50 Ivy League institutions do not award athletic
scholarships and may only award financial aid to student-athletes who
SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 3 (3d ed. 1957). To prevent unjust
enrichment, a contract implied in law (also known as a quasi-contract) may be found by a
court even when no party has made any promise. The existence of a quasi-contract does not
depend on the apparent intention of the parties. See BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1245 (6th
ed. 1990).
45 See, e.g., Marshall v. Regis Educ. Corp., 666 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1981); Bobilin
v. Board of Educ., 403 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Haw. 1975).
46 See Hoeflich, supra note 18, at 599.
47 While some educational institutions, such as the members of the Ivy League, do not
offer athletic scholarships, these schools, nevertheless, actively recruit student-athletes to
participate in their athletic programs. See source cited infra note 50.
48 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 109 (discussing Lowenthal v. Vanderbilt, No. A 8525
(Tenn. Ch. Ct., Davidson County, 1977)).
49 Id. In Lowenthal, a group of students brought suit under an implied contract theory
for the failure of a graduate management program offered by the University. The program
promised high quality academic and practical training leading to careers in management.
The students filed their claim when internal problems led the University to stop accepting
new students into the program. The court ruled in favor of the students and awarded
damages.
50 Disgnrntled Members of the Yale University Wrestling Team have Sued the
Institution, CHRON. IGHER EDUC., Dec. 4, 1991, at A49.
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demonstrate financial need. 51 The wrestlers argued, however, that Yale
breached an implied contract that arose when it recruited them to participate in
the school's wrestling program.52 It is important to recognize that many
institutions that do not offer scholarships, such as Yale, still actively recruit
student-athletes. Under such circumstances, it is understandable that promises
made by coaches during the recruitment of student-athletes may play a
significant factor in the decision whether to attend a particular institution. As a
result, a convincing argument can be made in favor of the wrestlers' position
despite the absence of an express contract.
The resolution of the Yale case may have a significant legal impact on
Division I institutions that contemplate canceling their athletic programs.
Furthermore, it is apparent that student-athletes who receive athletic
scholarships must be provided some legal protection based on their contractual
relationship with the university. According to Derek Johnson, under the
present terms of an athletic scholarship, the student-athlete is "forced to rely on
the good faith of the university to perform its part of the bargain without a
known avenue of recourse should a breach occur." 53 Supported by NCAA
rules and regulations that favor the awarding institution, the university holds
the superior bargaining position in athletic scholarship agreements. Application
of contract law could address some of the existing inequities.
IV. SECTION 117 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
A. The Rensing Court's Discussion of Party Intent
In determining whether an employment contract existed between the
student-athlete and the university, the Rensing court stressed the importance of
examining the intent of the parties to enter into an employment relationship. 54
The court, however, conducted a cursory analysis of the issue by applying a
limited definition of "pay" and relying on the provision of section 117 of the
Internal Revenue Code.55 The court concluded that both parties lacked the
intent to enter into an employment contract. 56
In assessing the university's intent the Rensing court relied on the argument
that the athletic scholarship awarded was not considered "pay" by both the
51 A. Bartlett Giamatti, Yale and Athletics: A Sense of Proportion, YALE ALUMNI
MAo., May 1980, at 13.
52 Id.
53 Johnson, supra note 4, at 111.
54 Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind.
1983).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1175.
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university and the NCAA, pursuant to its Constitution and bylaws.57 However,
the university did provide Rensing with scholarship benefits valued at $2,374
annually and the financial aid agreement required Rensing to render services
beyond athletic participation to the athletic department.58 Such an arrangement
provides strong evidence that the athletic scholarship agreement actually created
a quidpro quo.59
The court's discussion of Rensing's intent focused on his failure to include
his scholarship benefits as gross income for tax purposes. 60 This argument,
however, is unpersuasive. Pursuant to section 117 of the Internal Revenue
Code, Rensing was not required to include the scholarship benefits as a portion
of gross income.61 Rensing's intent cannot be measured by his failure to treat
scholarship benefits as compensation for income tax purposes. Rather, it is
likely that his decision to exclude the benefits from gross income was made on
the basis that the tax code permitted it.
B. The Inclusion of Athletic Scholarship Benefits in Gross Income
Despite the problems with the Rensing court's reliance on section 117 to
prove intent, further examination of other courts' treatment of this section
suggests that athletic scholarship benefits should not be excluded from gross
income. The courts most frequently apply one of two tests, the primary
purpose test or the quid pro quo test, to determine whether scholarship grants
can be excluded from gross income.62 "The primary purpose test focuses on
the relationship between the grantor and the grantee." 63 If the court finds that
the grantor gave the award largely for the grantor's own benefit, then the
grantee may not exclude the amount of the award from gross income. 64
57 As stated above, the 1982-83 NCAA Constitution recognizes scholarships as a form
of compensation. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
58 Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 437 N.E.2d 78, 80 (Ind. Ct. App.
1982). The financial aid agreement between Indiana State University and Rensing required
him to remain eligible for competition and, if injured, to assist in other tasks associated with
the conduct of the athletic program within the limits of his physical capabilities. Id.
59 Rafferty, supra note 26, at 100.
60 Reusing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (hnd.
1983).
61 I.R.C. § 117 (1988). In cases involving athletic scholarship benefits, the courts
applied section 117(a)(1) which stated that "[giross income does include any amount
received as a qualified scholarship ... at an educational organization." Id.
62 See Hoeflich, supra note 18, at 588-91.
63 Id. at 588.
64 Id.
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However, if the award primarily benefits the grantee, then the grantee may
exclude it pursuant to section 117.65
Since 1970, courts have generally applied the quid pro quo test.66 In
Bingler v. Johnson, 67 the United States Supreme Court relied on the quid pro
quo test in upholding the validity of section 1.1174(c)(1) of the Treasury
Regulations. 68 The Court stated: "The thrust of the provision dealing with the
compensation is that bargained-for payments, given only as a 'quo' in return
for the 'quid' of services rendered-whether past, present, or future-should
not be excludable from income as 'scholarship' funds." 69
Upon examining the current one-year athletic scholarship, courts using
either test could find that student-athletes should not be permitted to exclude
scholarship benefits under section 117. Applying the primary purpose test, the
benefits accruing to the educational institution seem substantially to outweigh
the benefits received by the student-athlete. Adam Hoeflich notes that the
university views the student-athlete who participates in major college sports as
a "profit-making asset": "The athlete's play increases attendance, bolsters
student morale, augments the school's reputation, [and] heightens alumni
awareness and support .... "70 While the student-athlete certainly receives
benefits from an athletic scholarship, it is difficult to argue that the primary
focus of the relationship between the student-athlete and the university is the
education of the athlete. A recent study of student-athletes entering Division I
institutions in 1983 and 1984 found that football and basketball players
graduated at a rate significantly below the rate of graduation for the general
student body.71 It appears that, given the present realities of intercollegiate
65 See, e.g., Hembree v. United States, 464 F.2d 1262, 1264 (4th Cir. 1972).
66 Hoeflich, supra note 18, at 588.
67 394 U.S. 741 (1969). Respondents held positions at a laboratory operated by the
Westinghouse Electric Corporation and participated in a two-phase fellowship program. The
first phase entailed a work-study arrangement in which employees held regular jobs while
attending classes on a part-time basis. Tuition and expenses associated with attending classes
were paid for by the company. The second phase granted participating employees an
educational leave of absence enabling them to work on their dissertations full-time while
receiving 70% to 90% of their prior salaries. Respondents filed refund claims for the
federal income tax withheld by Westinghouse for the amounts paid to them while on
educational leave. The Supreme Court held that Treasury Regulation § 1.117-(4)(c),
promulgated under section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code, is valid and that amounts
received as scholarships are not excludable if primarily for the benefit of the grantor. Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 757-58.
7 0 Hoeffich, supra note 18, at 599.
71 Steve Wieberg, Study Reveals Nagging Problems, USA TODAY, July 6, 1992, at
8C. The NCAA study revealed that 38% of basketball players and 45% of football players
graduated within six years of enrollment as compared to the general student body rate of
52% over the same period.
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sports, athletic scholarship benefits should not be excluded from gross income
under the primary purpose test.
Under the quidpro quo test, if a student is required to "perform services,
then that student may not exclude the scholarship from gross income.72 The
NCAA requires that athletic scholarships be awarded on an annual basis. 73 To
receive full benefits over the term of the scholarship, the recipients must render
themselves academically eligible, must not "fraudulently misrepresent any
information on an application, letter of intent or financial aid agreement, must
not engage in serious misconduct warranting substantial disciplinary penalty,
and must continue to participate in the athletic program. 74 Failure to meet any
of these requirements is considered a breach of the scholarship agreement 75 and
permits the university to cancel scholarship benefits during the one-year
period.76 Under the current system, athletic scholarships create a quidpro quo
relationship because the student is required to perform services for the
university. In addition, this relationship places power in the hands of the
university which, in certain circumstances, may cancel scholarship benefits
during the term of the award. 77
C. Revenue Ruling 77-263
While discussing section 117, the Rensing court referred to Revenue
Ruling 77-263, 78 which specifically states that recipients of athletic scholarships
are not to be taxed on scholarship proceeds. Yet, the hypothetical
circumstances set forth in the Revenue Ruling 77-263 are out of step with
today's "big business" environment in intercollegiate athletics. Revenue Ruling
77-263 hypothesizes an athletic scholarship award with three principal features:
72 Hoeflich, supra note 18, at 602.
73 NCAA BYLAWS § 15.3.3.1 (1991-92).
74 NCAA BYLAWS § 15.3.4.1 (1991-92).
75 See Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E. 2d 379 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
192 S.E.2d 197 (N.C. 1972).
76 NCAA BYLAWS § 15.3.4.1 (1991-92). It is important to note that in the case of a
student-athlete who voluntarily withdraws from a team for personal reasons, the university
must wait until the end of the quarter or semester to cancel further scholarship benefits. Id.
7 7 The NCAA rules only prevent a university from terminating a student-athlete's
scholarship benefits during the award term on the basis of injury or athletic ability. NCAA
BYLAws § 15.3.4.2 (1991-92). But see Hoeflich, supra note 18, at 602. Hoeflich contends
that the one-year scholarship does not impose any requirements on the students. If a student-
athlete does not participate, Hoeflich asserts that the scholarship is not taken away, but
rather renewal is not granted at the end of the scholarship term. This argument, however,
fails to consider the wide scope of power that a university has to terminate a student-
athlete's scholarship during the term pursuant to NCAA BYLAws section 15.3.4.1.
78 Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47.
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(i) The awarding institution expects, but does not require, student participation
in the student's sport; (ii) The awarding institution cannot terminate the benefits
in the event of an injury or in the case of the student's unilateral decision to
withdraw; and (iii) There are no additionally imposed requirements in lieu of
participation in the sports program. 79 On the basis of these facts and the quid
pro quo test, the ruling holds that the university does not require any services
from its scholarship athletes. 80
Revenue Ruling 77-263, however, neither reflects the reality of
contemporary intercollegiate athletics nor the terms of current athletic
scholarship agreements. First, as previously discussed, a quid pro quo
relationship does exist between the student-athlete and the university.81 Second,
while the IRS concluded that athletic scholarships are awarded by the university
primarily to aid recipients in pursuing their studies, this contention seems to be
clearly contradicted by the documented findings that reflect the "big business"
environment of college sports. 82 Finally, the assumption that the university
cannot terminate the scholarship agreement upon the student's unilateral
decision to withdraw from the athletic program does not comply with the
current NCAA rules. 83 Thus, the facts underlying the decision in Revenue
Ruling 77-263 simply do not reflect reality.
It is important to note that while the IRS has yet to alter its position on the
taxation of athletic scholarships, recent developments suggest that the IRS is
responding to the changing nature of intercollegiate athletics. In 1991, in an
effort to prevent universities from continuing to overstep the bounds of their
tax-exempt status, the IRS informed The Ohio State University that "it must
pay unrelated-business income tax on revenues received from advertising on its
scoreboard." 84 In another recent decision, the IRS determined that multi-
million dollar contributions by the sponsors of the Cotton and Hancock bowls,
Mobil Corporation and John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance, respectively, to
the nonprofit bowl organizing committees are to be considered advertising
payments.85 The IRS contended that the corporate monies received by the
organizers of the two bowl games were not related to the committees' tax-
79 Id.
80 Id. at 48.
81 See Hoeffich, supra note 18, at 602; see also NCAA BYLAWS § 15.3.4.1(d) (1991-
92). The university has the right to terminate scholarship benefits during the period of the
award if a student voluntarily withdraws from his or her sport. Id.
82 See supra notes 1 and 71 and accompanying text.
83 See NCAA BYLAWs § 15.3.4.1(d) (1991-92).
84 The Internal Revenue Service, Which Has Shown Renewed Interest in the Business of
College Sports, Is at It Again, CHRON. HIGHEREDUC., Oct. 9, 1991, at A41.
85 John Steinbreder, Bowled Over; An IRS Ruling Worries Bowl Game Oflfcials, TiME,
Dec. 16, 1991, at 20.
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exempt status and must be taxed as unrelated business income.86 While the
ruling is limited solely to revenue received from Mobil Corporation and John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance, it may soon have a significant financial impact
on other major intercollegiate sporting events.87
While recent actions taken by the IRS may represent change, the general
position of the IRS regarding athletic scholarships still does not comport with
the realities of intercollegiate athletics. The current IRS treatment of athletic
scholarships not only fails to take into account the provisions of the NCAA
bylaws, but also fails to comply with the spirit of section 117, which adheres to
the belief that athletic scholarships are primarily for the educational
advancement of the student-athlete.
V. DUE PROCESS IN SCHOLARSHIP TERMINATION CASES
The Rensing court did not address the issue of whether due process
protections must be accorded to student-athletes with athletic scholarships.
Nevertheless, due process protection has been a concern when state universities
have either prematurely terminated or failed to renew scholarships without fair
hearings.88 The Fourteenth Amendment ensures that no state shall deprive any
person of property interest without due process of law.89 Some courts and
critics have argued that the contractual nature of athletic scholarships provides
the student with an entitlement to educational and financial benefits. 90
One case illustrating the need to accord athletic-scholarship students due
process before denying the renewal of their benefits is Conard v. University of
Washington.91 In Conard, two varsity football players, Conard and Fudzie,
sued the University of Washington for breach of contract. The breach was said
to have resulted from the University's decision to deny scholarship renewal for
misconduct. 92 While the trial court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the Washington Court of Appeals found that "Fudzie's
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See Conard v. University of Wash., 814 P.2d 1242 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 834 P.2d 17 (Wash. 1992).
89 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment reads in part: "nor
shall any State deprive any person of ife, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person ... the equal protection of the laws." Id.
9 0See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The court stated, "[tio
have a property interest in a benefit... [he must have more than a unilateral expectation
of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id.
91 Conard, 814 P.2d at 1242.
92 Fudzie and Conard both brought suit against the University and filed a separate
action for contract interference against Don James, the head coach of the University's
football team.
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scholarship, issued under a representation that it would be renewed subject to
certain conditions, provided him with a legitimate claim of entitlement that
warrant[ed] the protection of due process before any deprivation of that claim
of entitlement." 93 The court held that the University hearing regarding the
nonrenewal of Fudzie's athletic scholarship benefits did not provide the
student-athlete with minimum due process protection. The case was reversed
and remanded to the University for an adequate hearing pursuant to procedures
outlined by the court.94
On August 6, 1992, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed the Court
of Appeals decision, holding in part that the plaintiffs did not have a protected
property interest in the renewal of their athletic scholarships and thus were not
entitled to due process protection. 95 In failing to uphold minimum due process
safeguards for Fudzie, the Washington Supreme Court stated in its analysis that
the duration and terms of the financial aid contract were "not sufficiently
definite to establish a legitimate claim of entitlement to the renewal of
[Fudzie's] athletic scholarship." 96 This decision simply reinforces the
imbalance of power that exists between the student-athlete and the university.
Despite the Court of Appeals' findings that the University issued the athletic
scholarship under the representation that it would be "renewed subject to
certain conditions" and that it was the University's practice to renew such
scholarships for at least four years,97 the Washington Supreme Court
concluded that the University only promised to consider renewal of the
benefits. 98
The Washington Supreme Court's decision does not comport with
contemporary intercollegiate athletics. High school athletes are often vigorously
recruited with the promise and expectation that they will be offered an athletic
scholarship for four years subject to several renewal conditions. 99 While the
duration of an athletic scholarship agreement is in form limited to one year, the
practices and rules associated with athletes' attendance and participation in
university athletic programs reflect a longer term agreement. The aggressive
recruiting tactics aimed at enticing student-athletes to attend a particular
university and the NCAA provision severely restricting student-athletes from
93 Conard, 814 P.2d at 1246.
94 Id. at 1247. In addition, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of
Conard's complaint because his academic performance made him ineligible for scholarship
renewal and he failed to request a hearing after being notified of the nonrenewal of his
scholarship. Id. at 1245. The court also affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claim
against James. Id. at 1248.
95 Conard v. University of Wash., 834 P.2d 17, 22 (Wash. 1992).
96 Id.
97 Conard, 814 P.2d at 1246.
98 Conard, 834 P.2d at 22.
99 See NCAA BYLAws § 15.3.5 (1991-92).
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transferring to another institution strongly suggest that both parties intend to
enter into a four-year agreement.10° In light of these factors, it is evident that
the Washington Court of Appeals arrived at the proper interpretation of the
contract between Fudzie and the University by recognizing the reality of
today's scholarship offers.
Until 1988, many critics asserted that student-athletes attending both state
and private educational institutions should be afforded due process
protection.10 1 It was argued that "[b]oth public and private universities have
surrendered to the NCAA their power to regulate college athletics and the
NCAA has, in turn, adopted rules and regulations by means of a process in
which public as well as private schools participate."102 Once the NCAA rules
were adopted by the membership, the rules applied with equal force to both
public and private institutions. It was concluded that there appeared to be no
distinction between NCAA action and state action.103
In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian,10 4 however, the
United States Supreme Court held that the suspension of the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) head basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian, in
compliance with NCAA rules and recommendations, did not transform the
NCAA into a state actor. Tarkanian had filed suit against both the University
and the NCAA under section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code for
deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law. The coach
contended that by adhering to NCAA rules the University transformed them
into state rules, and consequently, the NCAA into a state actor. 10 5 While the
Court conceded that "a state university without question is a state actor," it did
not accept Tarkanian's position that the alleged conduct was attributable to the
state of Nevada.10 6 The Court concluded that UNLV's acceptance of NCAA
regulations did not transform them into state rules because the University
retained the power to withdraw from the NCAA and establish its own
standards.10 7 Furthermore, the Court stated that UNLV did not delegate power
to the NCAA to take specific action against any University employee. Rather,
the NCAA was deemed a private actor in an adversarial relationship with
UNLV as a result of its investigation of the University's basketball program.' 08
100 See NCAA BYLAWs § 14.6.1 (1991-92).
101 See, e.g., Brian L. Porto, Note, Balancing Process and Academic Integrity in
Intercollegiate Atldetics: 7he Scholarship Athlete's Limited Property Interest in Eligibility,
62 IND. L.J 1151, 1157 (1986).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
105 Id. at 194.
106 Id. at 192-95.
107 Id. at 194-95.
108 Id. at 196.
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The NCAA bylaws presently require a hearing, upon request, if the
educational institution decides not to renew the student-athlete's scholarship.10 9
The NCAA, however, requires only that the institution establish "reasonable
procedures" for conducting such a hearing.110 What constitutes "reasonable
procedures" is a question left to the interpretation of the university.
Though the NCAA has yet to respond to the inequities of the current
system, perhaps a partial solution can be found in the Court of Appeals
decision in Conard. In Conard, the court stated that a student-athlete facing
termination of scholarship benefits should, at a minimum, be provided with
timely copies of any reports on which nonrenewal is based, an opportunity to
respond and rebut the information, and a hearing conducted by an impartial
tribunal. 11' Despite the courts' continued reluctance to grant student-athletes
due process protection in nonrenewal cases, these procedural guidelines could
still be adopted by the NCAA and apply to all student-athletes at both public
and private institutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Rensing court conducted a one-sided examination of the athletic
scholarship agreement and the relationship between the student-athlete and the
university, its decision might be justified on public policy grounds. Some
courts have expressed concern that recognizing an employee-employer
relationship would expose educational institutions to an array of legal claims,
including vicarious liability for torts committed in athletic competition. 1"2 Such
liability could drain funds allocated to educational resources. Classifying the
student-athlete as an employee of the school might result in scholarship benefits
being taxed as income to the student-athlete, and may even require the
educational institution to include the student-athletes in its payroll procedures
by withholding federal and state income taxes and social security. 113 In
addition, granting student-athletes status as employees may lead to demands for
such benefits as group life and dental insurance. 114 It could also limit the legal
109 NCAA BYLAws § 15.3.5.1.1 (1991-92).
110 Id.
I11 Conard v. University of Wash., 814 P.2d 1242, 1246 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 834 P.2d 17 (Wash. 1992).
112 See, e.g., Townsend v. California, 237 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Ct. App. 1987). This case
involved a San Jose State University basketball player who struck Raymond Townsend, a
UCLA player, during a game between the two teams. Because he was physically injured,
Townsend sued the State of California, among others, under the theory of respondeat
superior. The court ruled in favor of defendants.





options available to those who suffer injuries while participating in their
sport. 115 Some states have already attempted to resolve this problem. Through
legislative action, several states have amended their labor codes to exclude
student-athletes from the definition of an "employee." 116 This action was
designed to prevent injured student-athletes from filing claims for worker's
compensation benefits.
The Rensing case, however, illustrates the need for reform in the area of
scholarship agreements. The current one-year scholarship agreement does not
reflect the educational objectives promulgated by the NCAA and adopted by its
members. The terms are overly restrictive and the student-athlete's bargaining
power is severely limited. Furthermore, the one-year term transforms the
athletic scholarship into a series of short-term contracts. These contracts
provide an opportunity for coaches and other members of the university to
exert pressure on student-athletes to improve their athletic performance by
threatening nonrenewal of scholarship benefits.
In an effort to address some of the problems, the NCAA should consider
requiring all athletic scholarships to be awarded for a minimum of four years1 17
subject to three requirements: the athlete (1) Must maintain academic eligibility
pursuant to present NCAA and university minimum standards; (2) Must not
engage in serious misconduct warranting disciplinary penalty; and (3) Must
participate in his or her sport. Those injured and unable to participate will not
lose their scholarships as long as the other requirements are met. Also, athletic
ability will not be used as a factor in determining premature scholarship
termination. Finally, the NCAA should adopt explicit hearing procedures
which guarantee the equivalent of due process protection for all student-athletes
in cases that threaten the loss of scholarship benefits.
The proposed changes are designed to limit some of the potential abuses by
the educational institution that exists under the current system. Also, in light of
the present realities of intercollegiate athletics, such changes would be more
reflective of a strong commitment by the institutions to provide an education to
their student-athletes. Accompanying these measures, NCAA member
institutions must continue to place more emphasis on academics in an effort to
ensure that student-athletes do not simply attend college, but also graduate.
Without further academic reform and changes to the current athletic scholarship
115 Under workers' compensation laws, an injured student-athlete would be limited to
workers' compensation benefits from the educational institution and prevented from
pursuing other remedies based on tort liability. See 82 AM. JUR. 2D. Workmen
Compensation § 20 (1992).
116 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(k) (West 1989).
117 The NCAA requires that student-athletes complete their seasons of participation in
intercollegiate competition within five calendar years from the beginning of the semester or
quarter in which they first registered. See NCAA BYLAws § 14.2.1 (1991-92).
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agreement, it is difficult to accept the Rensing court's assertion that the student-
athlete is still "first and foremost a student."118
Daniel Nestel
118 Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind.
1983).
